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Unlocking Catholic Social Doctrine:
Narrative as Key
William Joseph Wagner
I. Introduction
In the case of the Catholic law school at least, Catholic social doctrine
answers a need. The Catholic Church is in need of a program and
Catholic law schools are there to advance that program, so for this
reason there must be Catholic social doctrine. The stance of the Church,
as reflected in the existence of these Catholic law schools, reflects a dual
commitment of service to the good of the larger society, on essentially its
terms, and, at the same time, to the integrity of the Church’s own
perspective independent of the drift of society.1 The Church’s need for
independence flows from the integrity of the faith.2 As a result of this
dual requirement, the Church needs directives that travel light so that
they can encapsulate and preserve the distinctive Catholic difference,
but still be adopted within a law school structured to the needs of the
William Wagner is Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy and
Culture, Columbus School of Law, the Catholic University of America.
1 Themission statements of law schools with Catholic affiliations reflect just this tension.
Language from three such statements can be cited as representative: One school asserts
that it is “rooted in the Catholic tradition that emphasizes the unique value of individual
human lives and our endowment with free will. It inspires us to provide a professional
education . . .” (Villanova Law School); another states that it “stands in . . . the . . . tradition
of common law based on court decisions, customs, and common usages; and the Catholic
tradition, which brings specific spiritual and moral values to bear upon daily life and legal
judgments” (University of Notre Dame Law School); and a third declares that it has a “core
commitment to the ideals of the dignity of each human person; respect for the inviolability
of all human life; justice rooted in the common good; the recognition and protection of
human rights as gifts of the Creator” and that it strives “to impart to our students a
comprehensive set of practical competencies, a broad range of doctrinal knowledge, and an
unwavering commitment to the ethical practice of law (Catholic University Law School).
2 That the faith poses an inviolable demand of integrity is a constant in Christian
theology going back to the early Fathers of the Church who framed the idea in terms of
a “rule of faith.” See Irenaeus, Adversus Haeres., ed. Migne, P.G., VII; Tertullian, De
praescriptionibus Haereticorum, (Hurter ed., 1870); Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses, ed.
Migne, P.G., XXXIII; Cyril of Alexandria, Second Letter to Nestorius, termed “the Rule
of Faith” (epistole kanonike) by the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; Vincent of
Lerins, Commonitorium, (Hurter ed.)
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larger society. Functionally, Catholic social doctrine has precisely this
Janus-like quality.
The Church’s reliance on Catholic social doctrine to serve in this way
in Church affiliated law schools is hardly surprising. Doctrine is every-
where a prerequisite where human capital must be formed to advance a
program. That is the point of programmatic indoctrination. Think, in
the last presidential campaign, of the Obama campaign’s very orga-
nized distribution of quasi-doctrinal “talking points” to its local cam-
paign organizers.3 Doctrine, grasped as such directives or marching
orders, supplies a “platform” for a constructive social vision. As such, it
functions midway between genuine social and political philosophy and
concrete policy decisions. Doctrine can inform the application of the
levers of power in pursuit of an envisioned societal direction, in a way
that purely theoretical ideas cannot.
The formulation of doctrine has been a feature of the Catholic
Church’s program from very early in its history. Obviously in this latter
setting doctrine has been advanced with a peculiar concern for content
and continuity that would not be present in a passing political cam-
paign, however large a role that campaign assigns to the theological
virtue of hope.4 Throughout the centuries, the Church has used doc-
trine as perhaps the linchpin of its institutionalized program of evange-
lization. It has relied on doctrine as the rule or measure both of the
credendum (that which is to be believed) and the agendum (that which
is to be done) in virtually all times and places.5 Thus, we find from the
earliest centuries, the Church’s creedal statements and its canons.6
3 Sidney M. Milkis & Jesse H. Rhodes, Barack Obama, the Democratic Party, and the
Future of the “New American Party System,” 7 J. APPLIED RESEARCH IN CONTEMP. POLITICS
1 (2009).
4 WOLFGANG MIEDER, “YES WE CAN”: BARACK OBAMA’S PROVERBIAL RHETORIC (2009).
5 A very early example of the Church’s doctrinal statement of belief is the Apostles’
Creed. See PIOTR ASHWIN-SIEJKOWSKI, APOSTLE’S CREED: THE APOSTLES’ CREED AND ITS EARLY
CHRISTIAN Context (2009). A very early example of a quasi-doctrinal statement of
“canons” of conduct would be the didache. SeeWILLIAM VARNER, THE WAY OF THE DIDACHE:
THE FIRST CHRISTIAN HANDBOOK (2007). However, it is worth noting that:
Dogma in the sense in which the term is used nowadays in the Church and in theology (a usage
which only became definite and universal in the 18th century) is a proposition which is the
object of fides divina et catholica, in other words one which the Church explicitly propounds as
revealed by God (citation omitted), in such a way that its denial is condemned by the Church as
heresy and anathematized.
KARL RAHNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY (THE CONCISE SACRAMENTUM MUNDI) 354 (1975).
6 See generally JAROSLAV PELIKAN, CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE CHRISTIAN
TRADITION (2003). For a treatment of the Church’s reliance on doctrine for programmatic
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The experience of the Church over time, however, has made it clear
that it cannot subsist solely on doctrine. It has also, more generally,
shown that doctrine cannot stand alone. Doctrine is effective, in the
context of the Christian Church, only when it is transmitted within a
lived community of faith and action sufficiently informed by theological
and philosophical understanding. Doctrine, then, stabilizes and directs a
community which has already, as quasi-independent sources of life, its
ongoing prayer and praxis, as well as some sufficient depth of the under-
standing which theology and philosophy provide.7 From the perspective
of this essay, the coordination of these disparate elements occurs within
the consciousness of a community, most critically, only through common
participation in a narrative that imaginatively embodies, and thus
unifies and transmits the community’s identity through time.8 Neither
Christian doctrine, nor Christian philosophical or theological principle
can stand apart from a living connection with narrative. They find this
necessary connection with narrative, by drawing from one of several
intersecting Christian stories enshrining at their core “the Narrative” of
the Christian Gospel itself. Observe that the Nicaean Creed, a doctrinal
statement, itself, is worded in such a way as to tell us a story.9
goals, see Susan Wessel, LEO THE GREAT AND THE SPIRITUAL REBUILDING OF A UNIVERSAL
ROME (2008).
7 The Second Vatican Council made this insight a pervasive theme: “The words of the
holy fathers witness to the presence of this living tradition, whose wealth is poured into
the practice and life of the believing and praying Church.” SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL,
DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON DIVINE REVELATION ¶ 8 (1965). The theological renewal that
accompanied the Council also emphasized it. For example, Karl Rahner observed: “The
pastor should realize that he plays his part in the advance of the history of dogma.
Preaching the faith is not merely repetition of a simplified theology, but an anticipation
of theology. Its living vigour, (sic.) its problems and solutions carry the history of dogma
onwards. And it is precisely that dynamic movement towards the future of preaching
which ought to give life and energy to the pastor and which gives the question of the
past the gravity and significance without which the history of dogma would degenerate
into mere erudition.” RAHNER, supra note 5, at 366.
8 Paul Ricouer offers a conceptualization useful in developing the implications of this
idea. He observes that “subjects recognize themselves in the stories they tell about
themselves” and that “[t]he notion of narrative identity also indicates its fruitfulness
in that it can be applied to a community as well as an individual.” PAUL RICOUER, TIME
AND NARRATIVE (vol. 3) 247 (1990).
9 See The Nicene Creed, formally adopted by the Church at the Council of Chalcedon
in 451, reprinted in PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 27 (1877). The narrative
of the Nicean Creed begins by calling attention to “the making of heaven and earth.” Id.
It then recites the “pre-history” of the eternal procession of the Second from the First
person of the Holy Trinity through whom is making of heaven and earth take place. See
id. It continues with the incarnation of the Second Person through the power of the
Third person with the consent of the Virgin Mary and for the sake or the redemption of
the human race. See id. Then it moves to the passion of Christ, with his suffering, death
UNLOCKING CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE 291
The argument of the present essay is that the pragmatic pressures of
contemporary circumstances that lead to Catholic social doctrine – as
set out in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic
Church, for example,10 – to being strongly emphasized in Catholic law
schools should not be permitted to create a doctrinal hegemony severing
doctrine from the contextualization from which it draws its meaning.
Catholic social doctrine depends, for its coherence and truth, as do all of
the doctrinal formulations within Catholicism, on its relation to both
philosophical and theological understanding and, for the purposes of
my present inquiry, to a larger narrative.
The case for this thesis rightly begins with trenchant criticism of
the peculiar complacency that currently exists within circles of legal
thought devoted to Catholic Social Thought, with respect to the as-
sumption of an habitual, basically a doctrinaire point of view. It next
offers a contrasting vision of doctrine as merely partial, and as properly
dependent for its ground on reference to a fuller normative Christian
narrative. It goes on to explain that this necessary ground is found in
cosmic Christian narrative and narratives, but that linkage to the cos-
mic dimension of Christian narrative depends on an auxiliary bridging
narrative that serves to translate the cosmic into appropriately tempo-
ral terms. Specifically, it offers an account of the narrative of social
reconstruction which became current in Western social life in the later
part of the nineteenth century as precisely this bridging narrative.
Finally, it proposes that respect for narrative ground, context and
framework “unlocks” Catholic social doctrine, allowing access to its
normative content both in se and for purposes of application on contem-
porary issues in political and legal theory and of law and public policy.
II. A Perplexing Complacency of Catholic Social Thought in
the Face of Doctrine Detached from Narrative
When encountered unmoored from some carefully defined context,
“doctrine” has today a questionable reputation, does it not? Except in
and burial, resulting in the enthronement of Christ in divine and eternal power once
again within the Godhead. See id. It adds an envisioned “post-history” of the anticipated
return of Christ in glory to judge the living and the dead. See id. It concludes with an
attestation of validation of belief in these narrative elements, which is the Holy Trinity’s
condescension to communicate its truth through the Holy Spirit and the gift of the
historically and hierarchically attested Church, which confers grace of forgiveness. See
id. Finally, it closes by inviting anticipation of yet another level of narrative, which will
begin again with the resurrection and the life of a world to come. See id.
10 See generally PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL
DOCTRINE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2005) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
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very narrow contexts, as in the context of law where one speaks without
embarrassment of certain legal doctrines as explaining holdings in
court cases,11 the concept of doctrine is often considered the antithesis
of reasonable demonstration of truth. Reliance on “doctrine” may even
at times imply an unacceptable heteronomy and intellectual atrophy.12
The mention of “Marxist doctrine,” for example, suggests mindless, rote
expositions of warrants that crowd out all reasons.13 It implies lockstep
advancement of a program, of a party line. At a Catholic college, for that
matter, eyebrows would be raised, by a senior professor inquiring in
reference to a tenure file, “how sufficiently does the candidate articu-
late the distillation of doctrine?”
Even in the realm of theology, where doctrinal formulations are at
least not thought of as per se opposed to reasonable discourse, doctrinal
exposition frequently is considered to dominate only when the living
vision of the intellect and the life of faith have dried up. Its costs are
considered, on the one hand, factionalism among those who care about
doctrine but engage in doctrinal clashes14 and apathy and indifference,
on the other, among those who, after having been chilled by excessively
11 Legal doctrine has been defined as “[s]ystematic formulations of legal principles,
rules, conceptions, and standards with respect to particular situations, or types of case,
or fields of the legal order, in logically interdependent schemes, whereby reasoning by
proceed on the basis of the scheme and its logical implications. Examples are the
doctrine of consideration in contract, the doctrine of personal bar, and the doctrine of
respondeat superior (cross reference omitted). The development and formulation of
doctrines are the work of judges and jurists, not legislation, which treats of particular
rules only.” DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW (1980). Doctrine also has a
niche as intelligible in foreign policy where it depends on implicit reference to ideology
or interest. An example can be seen in the use of doctrinal terms to analyze the dynam-
ics of foreign policy. See, e.g., Uri Ra’Anan, Soviet Strategic Doctrine and the Soviet-
American Global Contest, 457 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE, 8-17 (1981).
12 EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (2002). See also KARL POPPER, THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK: IN
DEFENSE OF SCIENCE AND RATIONALITY (M.A. Notturno ed., 1996). In theological circles, a
prejudice against doctrine exists at points for the sake of religious conscience. “Among
some liberal groups opposition has arisen to any doctrinal standard as an unjust coer-
cion of the individual conscience.” Paul Kevin Meagher et al., Doctrinal Standard, in
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 1083 (1979).
13 See, e.g., JAMES GARVEY, MARXIST-LENINIST CHINA: MILITARY AND SOCIAL DOCTRINE (1960).
14 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (defending a
received paradigm in advance of new breakthroughs, academics will experience “a
period of profound insecurity” and parse ‘numerous articulations and ad hoc modifica-
tions of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict”); SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, THE
POWER OF IDEAS (2000) (discussing frustration caused by “the mechanical or unconscious,
as well as deliberate application of models where they do not work”).
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dogmatic presentations of the faith, abandon dogma, but by virtue of
the conditioning of their earlier doctrinally-oriented formation remain
disengaged from theoretical discourse and lively prayer.15
In most areas of discourse within the Catholic academic and intellec-
tual community, doctrine has been admittedly de-emphasized.16 In how
many areas of moral theology, does one hear the cataloguing of doc-
trinal points as the focal discussion?17 The settled, even eager adoption
within Catholic legal education of the categories of “Catholic Social
Doctrine” as the basis of entire curricular areas or institutional identi-
ties presents a remarkable contrast. In an age wary of doctrine, doc-
trine finds a perch in Catholic legal education.
This complacency has, at least, two explanations. One is legitimate to
be sure: Catholic social doctrine like manifesto formulations of rights,
e.g. the United Nations’Universal Declaration of Human Rights, serves
as a template for adoption in diverse legal systems.18 Like a uniform
15 The collapse of Catholic faith, after generations of conformism, in the population of
Quebec during the “quiet revolution” of the 1960s is often cited as an example. For one
perspective, see Benoıˆt Laplante, The Rise of Cohabitation in Quebec: Power of Religion
and Power over Religion, 31 CANADIAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1–24 (2006).
16 See generally Philip A. Egan’s description of the “doctrinal-catechetical style.” He
notes that “[u]nfortunately, even many theologians think this way, without realizing
that their philosophy is not as robust as they might like and in this case is actually
undermining their belief.” PHILOSOPHY AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY: A PRIMER 148-52 (2009).
This development was clear in the nouvelle theologie that led to the Second Vatican
Council. SeeHENRI DE LUBAC, THE MYSTERY OF THE SUPERNATURAL (1967). DeLubac speaks
of “a liquidation of the over-complicated systems [of doctrine] worked out in modern
times,” and he concludes:
Although it seems to me, no change need be made in the general economy of past teaching,
and although we can still adopt the idea our fathers have left us of our fundamental relation-
ship with our supernatural end, there is still much to be done both with our actual intellectual
requirements and with the present state of theology, and in views of the difficulties which the
development of thought has produced or accentuated there is a need to showmore clearly how
this key idea remains in completely in harmony with the demands of the faith.
Id. at 23. And, even then, he observes that the retrieval of original sources can “never be
purely and simply a return” to a doctrinal statement. Id.
17 Servais Pinckaers, O.P, develops a contemporary treatment of moral theology,
which is sensitively attentive to continuity within Christian ethics without being doc-
trinal in his exposition. He relies on philosophical and scriptural warrants as he offers
an account of Christian ethics, which is virtue-based and teleological. See THE SOURCES
OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1995). A comparison with the doctrinally oriented style of the
manualists found before Vatican II is instructive. See, e.g., HENRY DAVIS, MORAL AND
PASTORAL THEOLOGY (4th ed. 1943).
18 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and
294 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT – 7:2
statute, it can be ratified by enactment in a particular legal system. As
such, it means to come as “detachable.” But, the second explanation is
less legitimate and more questionable: Among Catholic legal scholars,
who are used to working with legal materials, this doctrine becomes
imbued with the illusion of actually having already the force of law
which may be allowed to substitute for contextualization of doctrine in
relation to true nondoctrinal matrices of meaning.
This latter cul de sac is what JeremyWaldron calls the “waste of time”
that occurs when legal reasoning proceeds (as it is all too capable of
doing) with hypothetical norms untethered to actual legal efficacy of
positive enactment.19 I would say that to the legal mind such hypothet-
ical declarations carry the illusion of making sense because all legal
norms make ultimate sense as having finality and overriding meaning
as “exclusionary reasons” because of the – in itself – ephemeral addition
of an assertion of “enactment.”20 The legal mind can make sense of
Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION
TO IMPACT 25-31 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison eds., 2000).
19 Waldron illustrates his point this way:
For example, if I wanted to waste your time, I could formulate a normative provision right
now from which one could infer, as a strictly textual matter, the time, place and subject class
to which the “law is supposed to apply;”
The Finger in the Ear Act: (1) This Act applies to all men who reside in New England.
(2) At some time on his twenty-first birthday, every person to whom this Act applies shall
put is finger in his ear and keep it there for two minutes. (3) Anyone who fails to do this
shall pay a fine of $100 to the New Haven Home for Stray Dogs. (4) This Act shall
commence on the first day of April 2001.
Standing by itself, of course this “statute” is anomalous. But it might be thought of as enacted
pursuant to a legislative norm of something I shall call “the New England legal system”:
New England Legislative Supremacy Principle: Any provision enacted in New
England, by being written in a publishable philosophical paper and spell-checked twice,
shall be law in New England as soon as it is brought to the attention of any resident in
New England other than the person who wrote it.
And if I wanted to waste more of your time than I have already, I could elaborate this “legal
system” at some length, nesting norms inside norms, showing how some norms entered into
the validity conditions of other norms, adding subsidiary norms in to interpret and enforce
the primary norms and so on. All this thought would be an idiotic and futile exercise. It would
hold no interest whatever, since the system of norms is purely notional and does not have the
appropriate real relation to the people, places, and times to which its various provisions
purport to apply.
Jeremy Waldron, Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRU-
DENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 361-62 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004).
20 For an account of how law enjoys a fundamental dimension of its intelligibility as
an “exclusionary reason” overriding other considerations, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY, 22-23, 32-33 (1979).
UNLOCKING CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE 295
convoluted sequences of – in themselves – hypothetical norms on the
merest premise that they might be, could be or would be at some point
subject to enactment. Because the doctrinal norms of Catholic social
thought are promulgated by the Pope and Bishops, who in a separate
legal system have lawmaking authority, and because their doctrinal
formulations hover as a kind of “hypothetical law” akin to that of man-
ifesto rights, the Catholic lawyer can all too readily hold all of Catholic
social thought in contemplation, however severed from every criteria of
sense, “as if ” it had the kind of meaning inhering in enacted laws or
laws proposed for enactment.
Let it be clear. Far from rejecting doctrine, the present Article, both as
a matter of its avowedly Catholic viewpoint and of its intention of con-
tributing to political discourse in support of programs of social recon-
struction, assumes that doctrine has its essential and even indispensible
uses. This Article’s discussion is premised, in fact, on an assumption – let
this also be express – that the rejection of doctrine has, in truth, gone too
far in some circles of Catholic theological discourse.21 Nonetheless, this
essay also assumes that the ordinary critique of overly doctrinaire
approaches within mainstream Catholic debate requires at a minimum
this acknowledgement: That doctrine is able to serve its purposes only
where it is adequately informed by theological and philosophical ideas
and is grounded in a persuasive Narrative. Needless to say, it can be so
informed and grounded only where it is also appropriated in an attitude
sufficiently infused with the three theological virtues.
When the need is perceived as great – as it might conceivably be at
present by those legal scholars who currently find themselves responsi-
ble for marshalling the resources needed to sustain the edifice of Cath-
olic law schools, the danger exists that those experiencing that need
will become forgetful of the inadequacy of doctrine taken alone and that
they will let go of the narrative thread assuming even that they ever
knew what it was. In that case, they would be up against the wall in
their need with no more than doctrine to rely upon. With nowhere to
turn, they might even then experience, at least internally, that painful
state of mind, a doctrinal-denunciatory stammer. Pope Pius IX’s Syllabus
21 As an example of an excessive allergy to doctrinal norms, one can cite the “Cologne
Declaration” as criticized by Cardinal Avery Dulles. Avery Dulles, The Freedom of
Theology, in FIRST THINGS (May 2008). As an example of a fruitful reliance on doctrinal
categories one can cite by contrast the “Hartford Declaration.” See Religion: The Hart-
ford Heresies, TIME, Feb. 10, 1975. The propositions included in the Hartford Declara-
tion can be found in Kenneth Baker, Theological Pitfalls and Their Consequences, in
HOMILETIC & PASTORAL REV. (Dec. 2000).
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of Errors,22 – that far cry from the creative vision of Pope Leo XIII’s
Rerum Novarum,23 – comes to mind as possible exemplar. The pertur-
bation of mind that Pope Gregory XVI experienced and publicized in his
encyclical Mirari Vos in that apparently bleak-seeming year 1832 simi-
larly stands as a salutary caution in this respect. As we give respectful
heed to poor Pope Gregory’s nearly fathomless lack of perspective, do
we not feel a special gratefulness for the blessing of the re-knit narra-
tive thread of Rerum Novarum just sixty short years later:
We speak of the things which you see with your own eyes, which We both bemoan.
Depravity exults; science is impudent; liberty, dissolute. The holiness of the sacred
is despised; the majesty of divine worship is not only disapproved by evil men, but
defiled and held up to ridicule. Hence sound doctrine is perverted and errors of all
kinds spread boldly. The laws of the sacred, the rights, institutions, and discipline –
none are safe from the audacity of those speaking evil. Our Roman See is harassed
violently and the bonds of unity are daily loosened and severed. The divine author-
ity of the Church is opposed and her rights shorn off. She is subjected to human
reason and with the greatest injustice exposed to the hatred of the people and
reduced to vile servitude. The obedience due bishops is denied and their rights are
trampled underfoot. Furthermore, academies and schools resound with new, mon-
strous opinions which openly attack the Catholic faith; this horrible and nefarious
war is openly and even publically waged. Thus, by institutions and by the example
of teachers, the minds of the youth are corrupted and a tremendous blow is dealt to
religion and the perversion of morals is spread. So the restraints of religion are
thrown off, by which alone kingdoms stand. We see the destruction of public order,
the fall of principalities, and the overturning of all legitimate power approaching.
Indeed this great mass of calamities had its inception in the heretical societies and
sects in which all that is sacrilegious, infamous and blasphemous has gathered as
bilge water in a ships hold, a congealed mass of all filth.24
III. The Narrative that Sustains Catholic Social Doctrine
Catholic doctrine of all kinds and Catholic philosophy and theology,
not to mention to living faith and practice within the communion of
Catholic believers, can occur only by virtue of consciousness of a narra-
tive framework. Such a framework comprises a sequence of stories,
each building upon one another by culminating in or referring back to
the focal case of Christian narrative, the Gospel Account of the Paschal
Mystery of Christ: First, Creation; then Abraham called forth from Ur
to become the father of many children; next the People of Israel called
forth from Egypt and slavery to freedom; and then the assembly of the
Church as a pilgrim people in transit from the ascension of the risen
22 POPE PIUS IX, SYLLABUS OF ERRORS (1864).
23 POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (1891).
24 POPE GREGORY XVI, MIRARI VOS ¶ 5 (1831) (emphasis added).
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Christ to the anticipated parousia.25 All of these interfolded narrative
lines presuppose a dialogue between God and human beings and
starting and ending points within human history traceable to the finger
of God. All of them entail some notion of eschatology.26
On a more mundane level, Catholic consciousness presuppose aware-
ness of an historical narrative unfolding whereby the institutional
Church functions as a temporal sign precisely of these cosmic story
lines. The Church has throughout this process functioned by simulta-
neously marking out a reference to two poles at once: The pole of divine
transcendence, and no less that of human responsibility within his-
tory.27 The Catholic mind seeks to organize human affairs with a double
regard, on the one hand, for the truth of divine transcendence, and on
the other, for human action oriented to concrete human welfare. On the
temporal end of this equation, the printing of mass booklets, paving of
parish parking lots, and the funding of Catholic Charities soup kitchens
are part of the plot line. Throughout its history, the Church has been
challenged to keep the later, more mundane pole of its story line prop-
erly grounded in the former, cosmic one.28
Prior to modernity, the Church cultivated a variety of simple concepts
to bridge this divide. One thinks of the lives of the saints,29 and the
25 For perspectives on the role of narrative in sustaining the Christian community of
faith, see the essays in WHY NARRATIVE? READINGS IN NARRATIVE THEOLOGY (Stanley
Hauerwas & L. Gregory Jones eds., 1989). Perhaps the greatest theological treatment
of faith and narrative is found in Hans Urs von Balthasar’s five volume THEO-DRAMA:
THEOLOGICAL DRAMATIC THEORY (vol. 1, PROLEGOMENA (1988); vol. 2, DRAMATIS PERSONAE:
MAN IN GOD (1990); vol. 3, DRAMATIS PERSONAE: PERSONS IN CHRIST (1993); vol. 4, THE
ACTION (1994); and vol. 5, THE LAST ACT (1998)).
26 For a study of the ways in which the entrance into history of transcendence in the
Christ event alters understandings of human responsibility, see OSCAR CULLMAN, CHRIST
AND TIME: THE PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF TIME (1951). For diverse conceptions of
eschatology influencing thinking about social responsibility in modernity, see Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Modernity, History and Eschatology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ESCHA-
TOLOGY 493-99 (Jerry L. Walls ed., 2008).
27 The Second Vatican Council recognizes this bipolarity in the Church’s orientation
within time: “Since the Church is in Christ like a sacrament or as a sign and instrument
both of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race, it
desires now to unfoldmore fully to the faithful of the Church and to the whole world its own
inner nature and universal mission.” SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, LUMEN GENTIUM ¶ 1 (1964).
28 For a well known critique of the Catholic Church for its loss of its orientation to the
dimension of grace, see Martin Luther, On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church, in
MARTIN LUTHER, THREE TREATISES 123-66 (1990).
29 Peter Brown explores the role of the cult of “the martyrs and other holy dead” in
creating “localizing” centers of cultural life during late antiquity and the middle ages.
The shrine of the saint becomes a place where power and concord may come together in
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distinctive charisms of different religious orders;30 the two swords;31
the “freedom of the Church” from temporal restraints,32 and the mis-
sionary mandate of the Popes.33 With the advent of the Protestant
Reformation and early modernity, these traditional concepts were inad-
equate, and the Church leaned heavily on doctrine with the Council of
Trent as a stop gap.34 An interim narrative of marriage of altar and
throne in the power allocations of competing nation-states shored up
the Church’s conduct of its counter-reformation campaign.35 With the
French Revolution, this interim narrative fell apart. A doctrinally
defensive papacy held its ground in the early nineteenth Century with
the rearguard maneuvers such as those by Pope Gregory XVI and
Pope Pius IX mentioned above. The Church was attempting to quell
hemorrhaging losses as it simply made due without a bridging
narrative.36 One almost had a sense that the Church mistook the tides
solidarity and divine justice can be known on Earth. He sees such places as having the
constructive and ceremonial effect being “where men could stand in the searching and
merciful presence of a fellow human being.” See PETER BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS:
ITS RISE AND FUNCTION IN LATIN CHRISTIANITY 86, 98, 124, 127 (1981).
30 The charisms of the monastic and religious orders and the narratives of their
founding and their service within the Church substantially structured understandings
of the place of the Church in the world. See, e.g.,Brian Patrick McGuire, Monastic and
Religious Orders, c. 1100–c. 1350 in CHRISTIANITY IN WESTERN EUROPE C. 1100-1500, 54-72
(Miri Rubin & Walter Simons eds., 2009).
31 Normative concepts deemed to govern right outcomes in the dynamic tension in
claims of power by state and church had a substantial role in informing the narrative of
the story of the medieval church and society. For the assertion of the normative mean-
ing of this tension see GELASIUS I, DUO SUNT (494) and BONIFACE VIII, UNAM SANCTAM
(1302). For an account of the term “Two Swords” as providing a conceptualization of the
normative doctrine, see Doctrine of the Two Swords, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3586
(2d ed. 2005).
32 The normative status of the Church’s overriding impulse to evangelize in a world of
no boundaries gave shape to the narrative of the Church as a supranational organiza-
tion. See POPE GREGORY VII, LIBERTAS ECCLESIAE (1079).
33 The story of the mutual reinforcement that derived from the papacy as an institu-
tion and the formation of Europe as a Christian culture through papal missionary
initiatives provided a layer of narrative making sense of the Christian story. For a
contemporary account, see IAN N. WOOD, THE MISSIONARY LIFE: SAINTS AND EVANELISATION
OF EUROPE, 400-1050 (2001).
34 The Protestant narrative of a corrupt medieval Church elicited the bulwark of
doctrinal purification and promulgation. See generally NELSON H. MINNICH, COUNCILS OF
THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION: PISA I (1409) TO TRENT (1545-63) (2008).
35 Anxiety about control over the religious establishment in competing nation-states
formed a critical aspect of the Catholic narrative of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries. See G.W. SEARLE, THE COUNTER REFORMATION 113 – 60 (1974). See also MARTIN D.W.
JONES, THE COUNTER REFORMATION: RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1995).
36 Hans Frei describes the process whereby the collapse of the external historical
narrative of continuing ecclesial cohesion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
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of history with the gates of hell that could not be allowed to prevail
against it.37
By the close of the nineteenth century, however, with the appearance
of Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and Catholic social thought, the
Church, in a remarkable manifestation of inner resiliency, had arrived
at the new bridging narrative it needed. In addition to its reference to
the cosmic Christian narratives mentioned above, Catholic social doc-
trine depends for its truth and coherence, at all points, on at least an
implicit reference to the auxiliary of this inner-worldly narrative.
A. The Narrative of Progressive Social Reconstruction
To understand the bridging narrative, which explains the success of
the promulgation of Catholic social doctrine beginning with Leo XIII,
one must begin with the emergence of a common societal narrative of
progressive social reconstruction that a series of nineteenth century
developments, beyond the control of the Church itself, brought into
existence in the West.38 In other words, Leo did not invent this pros-
pect; he discovered it and brilliantly seized the historical moment it
offered. Catholic social doctrine even today makes sense only within
the narrative of its own gradual promulgation, where that promulga-
tion is, in turn, grafted into an awareness of this larger common tem-
plate. What Leo generated was admittedly not a one-way street, but
rather a two-way relationship whereby Catholic social doctrine, in turn,
precisely by relying on this larger societal imaginary has further per-
petuated and kept it alive.
With the French Revolution, the Church had found itself excluded
from the political order, the emergency of which represented the com-
bined outcome of both early modern social contract theory and the
advent of eighteenth-century constitutionalism.39 The premise of the
was accompanied by an internal rejection of the narrative dimension of biblical religion.
HANS W. FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH
CENTURY HERMENEUTICS (1974).
37 “And I say to thee: That thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build my church,
and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”Matthew 16:18 (Douay Reims).
38 A concept for how a society instantiates and in turn contemplates the evolving
meaning and application of such a narrative is offered by Charles Taylor in his “social
imaginary.” Taylor builds on the work of Jacques Lucan. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN
SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004).
39 Social contract theorists derived the authority of the state in a manner that
required the rejection of characteristic Catholic notions of ecclesial authority. Thus,
John Locke concludes that “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the
300 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT – 7:2
great chain of being and cosmic hierarchy, which had been the founda-
tion of political life, were no longer.40 As a result, the Church was
dislodged from its established niche. Far from being able to claim the
new lease of life that the late nineteenth-century narrative of social
reconstruction gave it as something it drew forth from its own treasury
of ideals, paradoxically, the Church obtained this benefit only because
of its own eviction from its earlier hierarchical priority.
With the secularization across Europe accompanying the dissolution
of the Holy Roman Empire in 1803, social services became the respon-
sibility of the civil authorities, rather than any longer being left to poor
relief and the charitable mission of the Church as such.41 Society began
a constructive task of consciously organizing social life to secure the
care of the many.42 The rise of positivism offered tools for an instrumen-
talism facilitative of social change.43 The rise of nineteenth-century
Germany idealism provided concepts whereby constructive engage-
ment in the service of the social good could be seen as organic and
communitarian.44 German idealism also offered a model whereby social
magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do
thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another
prince.” JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 35 (1689). In Montesquieu’s
eighteenth-century version of constitutionalism, the clergy are rejected as an
established “estate” that might be recognized as a part of the structure of society, much
less government. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1752) (1748).
40 For a depiction of the worldview that once supported a privileged role of the
Church as a sign of a higher law, see ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING:
A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1976).
41 In the wake of the French Revolution and the advent of the Napoleanic period,
the Holy Roman Empire dissolved the ecclesiastical principalities with the Reichs-
Deputations-Hauptschluss of 1803 and of the Holy Roman Empire itself dissolved in
1806. This change in fundamental order symbolized a separation of church and state in
Europe. Functions previously overseen by the Church or left to private almsgiving were
gradually made the focus of conscious and systemic state policy. In Germany, it led
under Bismarck to the founding the sozialstaat or social welfare state on terms that
entailed overt opposition to the role of the Catholic church in the kulturkampf. HAJO
HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY: 1840–1945, 366-70, 91-93, 472-509 (1969);
HERMANN BECK, THE ORIGINS OF THE AUTHORITARIAN WELFARE STATE IN PRUSSIA: CONSERVA-
TIVES, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION, 1815-1870 (1995).
42 KEES VAN KERSBERGEN & PHILIP MANOW, RELIGION, CLASS COALITIONS, AND WELFARE
STATES (2009).
43 Auguste Comte argued that the emergence of society from theological and meta-
physical phases to embrace positivism opened the door for benevolent revision of social
structures. AUGUSTE COMTE, A GENERALVIEW OF POSITIVISM (J.H. Bridges trans., 1865).
44 G.W.F. Hegel, for example, offered a systematic exposition of the relationships of
parenting, marriage, family, and civil society all of which oriented to the human
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change could be understood as caused by the introduction of ideas,
including critical ideas the Church brought forth from its own depos-
itary.45 Finally, with the rise of the social sciences through the work of
authors such as Weber and Troeltsch conceptual distinctions were
admitted, permitting the separation of description and evaluation of
societal structures, institutions and roles.46 It was now systematically
possible to describe and evaluate shifting societal conditions as a basis
for proposing (Christian) programmatic change.
Catholic social doctrine, as espoused by the Popes, is then unthink-
able except as a savvy exploitation of an opportunity provided by the
(providential) extra-ecclesial currency of the narrative of social recon-
struction arising with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. The intelligibility of Catholic social doctrine depends on its
relationship to this emerging narrative possibility. Reciprocally, the
continuous promulgation of Catholic social doctrine since 1891 has
measurably served to sustain and extend the life of the narrative of
social reconstruction within Western societies.47 The intelligibility of
aspiration to realize the good. GEORG W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 105-33 (T.M. Knox
trans., 1967).
45 See Deniz Tekiner, German Idealist Foundations of Durkheim’s Sociology and
Teleology of Knowledge, 3 THEORY & SCIENCE (2002).
46 SeeMax Weber’s definition of sociology:
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science which
attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal
explanation of its course and effects. In “action” is included all human behaviour when and
insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may
be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a
situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention or passively acquiescing in the
situation. Action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the
acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby
oriented in its course.
MAX WEBER, SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS (Wolf Heydebrand ed., 1994) (1897). Note that
Weber’s academic career commenced precisely at the time of the emergence of Catholic
social thought with the promulgation of Rerum novarum in 1891. Weber’s 1895 inaugu-
ral lecture at the University of Freiburg, published as Der Nationalstaat und die
Volkswirtschaftspolitik is contemporaneous with Rerum novarum. Ernst Troeltsch’s
sociological interpretation of Christian doctrine in The Social Teaching of the Christian
Churches likewise “helped set the stage for Christian social ethics to emerge as an
academic discipline.” J. PHILIP WOGAMAN & DOUGLAS M. STRONG, READINGS IN CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 231 (1996). Troeltsch began his university teaching career in 1891 contempora-
neous with the advent of Catholic social thought with Rerum novarum.
47 One can trace the contributions of the Catholic social encyclicals through a succes-
sion of eras: formation of the social state (Rerum novarum), American new deal
(Quadragesimo anno), European postwar European integration and creation of inter-
national organizations (Pacem in terries), international development (Populorum
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the Church’s narrative remains dependent on the societally generated
narrative on which it is granted. Francis Fukuyama has raised the
question of whether the narrative of progress towards the attainment
of a universal order, in the terms offered by the German idealism of
Kant and Hegel, and with it “history” as we know it, could be an end.48
Of course, from Hegel’s perspective, Hegel having declared that world
history had reached its end in 1806, Fukuyama’s inquiry may seem
belated.49 Fukuyama observes that, as all world cultures appear to
converge in a unitary economy and even something beginning to
approach a liberal democratic political order, there is a homogenization
of cultures and a disappearance of the tension of opposites which
appears to take away further apparent progress in a directional
sequence tending to coherence.50 The particularities around which
intermediate social institutions cohere are tending to disappear.51 So
too are the differences around which the human instinct for recognition
gathers.52 Thus the dynamic of change and human interaction on a
post-historical global plateau might be different. Those interested in
perpetuating Catholic social thought must remain attentive to the
terms on which the narrative of social reconstruction continues to
remain in play, whether as ongoing, or as now a past historical epoch
which remains of analogical significance to life on the global plateau.
IV. The Distinctive Catholic Contribution to the Narrative of
Social Reconstruction
From the close of the nineteenth century, the Popes (and the Second
Vatican Council) have at major intervals taken public judicial notice of
the evolving state of the social question and, in effect, ruled on what
measures of social reconstruction were required. At each step, they
promulgated their adjudicated conclusions in the form of general notice
to all people of good will of what was owed by all those with the power to
make a difference to those in need.53 Facially, their conclusions were
progression and Solicitudo Rei), and conclusion of the cold war (Centesimus Annus). For
a brief synopsis of phases of Catholic social thought, see EDWARD P. DEBERRI ET AL.,
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: OUR BEST KEPT SECRET (2004).
48 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 51 (1992).
49 Id. at 39.
50 Id. at 81.
51 Id. at 108, 126.
52 See id. at 181, 222.
53 In commenting on Pope Benedict XVI’s Caritatas in Veritate, Peter Steinfels com-
pares to United States Supreme Court opinions. Peter Steinfels, From the Vatican,
A Tough Read, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A12.
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offered to Catholic hierarchs and lay people as a program to take
through Catholic political participation to legislatures across the world.
In fact, their conclusions were offered to legislatures everywhere.
Papal and conciliar conclusions were offered at the level of what could
be called doctrinal programmatics or at most “middle-level” theory. But
these conclusions were never set out in isolation. They were always
deftly related to the fabric of the Church’s cosmic religious narrative
linking them to the pole of divine transcendence. Critically, these con-
clusions are carefully built on bridging concepts, such as God as the
summum bonum and the transcendent dignity of the human person,54
even as they were linked to each of the following: concrete human
need;55 a proposed evolution in contemporary societal institutional
structures;56 and the cosmic narratives of the larger Christian story.57
54 For example, to take Centesimus annus, the Church recites God as summum
bonum this way, recommending the rediscovery of “the person of Christ himself as the
existentially adequate response to the desire in every human heart for goodness, truth
and life.” POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 24 (1991). And, it refers to man’s
transcendent dignity this manner:
When the Church proclaims God’s salvation to man, when she offers and communicates the
life of God through the sacraments, when she gives direction to human life through the
commandments of love of God and neighbour, she contributes to the enrichment of human
dignity. [T]he Church . . . [e]ven on the eve of the third Millennium . . . continues to be “a sign
and safeguard of the transcendence of the human person” . . . .
Id. ¶ 58.
55 E.g., Centesimus annus concludes:
The Marxist solution has failed, but the realities of marginalization and exploitation remain
in the world, especially the Third World, as does the reality of human alienation, especially in
the more advanced countries. Against these phenomena the Church strongly raises her voice.
Vast multitudes are still living in conditions of great material and moral poverty.
Id. ¶ 42.
56 See e.g., Centesimus annus observes:
The Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens
in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and
holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means
when appropriate. Thus she cannot encourage the formation of narrow ruling groups which
usurp the power of the State for individual interests or for ideological ends.
Id. ¶ 46.
57 In closing, Centesimus annus strikes this cosmic note:
Mary, the Mother of the Redeemer, constantly remained beside Christ in his journey towards
the human family and in its midst, and she goes before the Church on the pilgrimage of faith.
May her maternal intercession accompany humanity towards the next Millennium, in fidelity
to him who “is the same yesterday and today and for ever” (cf. Heb 13:8), Jesus Christ our
Lord, in whose name I cordially impart my blessing to all.
Id. ¶ 62.
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In addition, they were set out within a particular literary genre ensur-
ing the inclusion of the third and last of these latter elements, replete
also with elements ensuring that application to policy debates in
particular countries and under specific circumstances, would occur in
a manner no less interwoven with the Church’s own more mundane
narrative of its own ongoing temporal institutional self-construction as
in service of a pilgrim community of faith.58
A. Bridging Time and the Cosmic Christian Narrative
The content of the policy agenda of the Catholic social initiative
offered in the papal social encyclicals was, in many ways, identical to
that of the liberal Protestant agenda of the Social Gospel movement.59
Limited to identifying concrete need and proposing evolving institu-
tional structures within society under a broad mantra of the “Father-
hood of God and the Brotherhood of Man,”60 the Social Gospel
movement, however, lacked both an adequate bridge to the cosmic
Christian narrative and a sufficient nexus to the continuing self-
constitution of the Church as an ongoing community. As a result, liberal
Protestantism fell prey to a completely immanent eschatology. Argu-
ably, its social mission cost it its soul as a Church. As a social move-
ment, by the 1920s the Social Gospel had been absorbed by “an ethos of
consumption”.61 By contrast, the Catholic “Social Gospel” of the papal
Encyclicals, painstakingly grafted into relevant Christian and Catholic
58 For example, Centesimus Annus begins, “The Centenary of the promulgation of the
Encyclical which begins with the words ‘Rerum novarum,’ by my predecessor of vener-
able memory Pope Leo XIII, is an occasion of great importance for the present history of
the Church and for my own Pontificate.” Id. ¶ 1.
59 See PETERW. WILLIAMS, AMERICA’S RELIGIONS: FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2002). The author argues:
A fundamental theme . . . [of Liberal Protestantism and the Social Gospel has been said to be
the absence] of sharp boundaries among the supernatural, natural, and individual worlds.
The divine and human thus stood not in a contradictory but rather in a complementary
relationship, with God’s grace permeating and redeeming the imperfect realm of creation.
Similarly redemption need and should not be marked by an abrupt change in consciousness
but rather should come about gradually and imperceptibly in the development of a children
through the influence of what . . . [is] called “Christian nurture.” This nature was not confined
to the church but was also carried out in the divinely ordained realms of the home, the school,
and society at large.
Id. at 256.
60 WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANIZING THE SOCIAL ORDER 128 (1914).
61 SUSAN CURTIS. A CONSUMING FAITH: THE SOCIAL GOSPEL AND MODERN AMERICAN CUL-
TURE 277 (1991).
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narratives is powerfully alive in 2009.62 The decisive difference between
the liberal Protestant Social Gospel and Catholic Social Thought is
this: all of the Church’s programmatic and doctrinal prescriptions are
very carefully aligned with a published and re-published imaginative
narrative always featuring as its centerpiece, God as the summum
bonum of human choice and action.
B. A Literary Genre Supportive of Narrative Understanding:
The Encyclical Letter
Although Catholic social thought, with the Compendium of Catholic
Social Doctrine, is now available in the form of doctrinal summary, that
is not the way it has been promulgated. It has rather been issued in
the form of paternal letters addressed by the Holy Father to named
recipients, e.g., in Rerum Novarum, “To Our Venerable Brethren the
Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other ordinaries of
places having Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See,”63 or, some-
what more expansively, in Centesimus Annus, “To His Venerable
Brothers in the Episcopate the Priests and Deacons, Families of Men
and Women religious, all the Christian Faithful and to all men and
women of good will.”64 As such, Catholic social doctrine is offered by the
Church in a literary genre which is epistolary. This form was popular in
the Greco-Roman world of antiquity. Within the papacy, even aside from
the Petrine letters of the New Testament, it dates back at least to the
Letter of St. Clement to the Corinthians.65 In American law, we know
it as it appears in the Federalist Papers written pseudonymously as
letters by Publius (modeled on consul Publius Valerius Publicola of the
early Roman Republic) addressed to the People of the State of New
York.66 We also recognize it as the dominant literary form within Chris-
tian Scripture, making up the Lucan, Pauline, Petrine and Jacobean
materials of the Christian New Testament, with the Gospel of Luke and
the Acts of the Apostles being addressed to one Theophilus.67 The other
62 The most recent encyclical in the series, Caritas in Veritate (2009), has been termed
“a remarkable document, brimming with profound ideas and moral passion and issued
at a time when it could hardly be more relevant.” Peter Steinfels, supra note 53.
63 Pope Leo XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (1891) ¶ 1.
64 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 54.
65 The epistle dates to the end of the reign of Domitian (95 or 96 C.E.). See First
Epistle of Clement, in THE ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY (vol. 1) 1055, 1060 (1992).
66 See e.g. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (Alexander Hamilton). For allusion intended with
“publius” and other background, see Publius in Glossary, in THE FEDERALIST (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
67 For a treatment of the epistolary genre of New Testament literature, see Joseph A.
Fitzmyer, New Testament Epistles, in THE JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 223-26. For
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Gospels, as Euagge´lia, are written, in a not unrelated genre, as kergymatic
proclamatory circulating news reports “to whom it may concern.”68
According to the epistolary form of the social encyclicals, the reader is
invited to join in an ongoing recurring conversation on the nature of the
criteria of social responsibility under evolving circumstances in a conti-
nuity which extends back in memory to the writings of the Christian
New Testament. Through participation in the dialogue form of these
letters, the reader is invited to share in the Church’s living project of
ongoing accountability, as a community, before God for the world, and,
in so doing, at each step to reaffirm her or his membership in the
community of the Church. At the same time that these writings offer
particular prescriptions for immediate infusion into contemporary pub-
lic policy debates under law at particular times, as has been the case in
all of the epistolaries accruing with the Church since the New Testa-
ment itself, they also constitute items destined to take their place
within the “correspondence file” or archival memory of the Church, in
support of future review of cases arising for the Popes’ and Christian
believers’ consideration over time, however history unfolds.
V. Implications of the Narrative Framework of Catholic Social
Thought for Its Application
Catholic social doctrine is set out in the Compendium precisely to assist
in the resolution of problems in political and theory and for application to
issues in law and public policy. As it has been developed thus far, the role
of narrative in grounding the meaning of Catholic social thought sug-
gests that caution is appropriate in any endeavor that would seek
directly and in too simplistic a way to apply elements of Catholic social
doctrine to such theoretical problems or policy issues. This complexity of
application has two causes: first, the authoritative meaning of each doc-
trinal elementwithin theCompendium remains inextricably linked to the
seamless narrative in which it first emerged; and second, the encapsula-
tion of doctrinal propositions ensures that they will remain impervious
to efforts to relate them to theoretical lines of reasoning in political theory
and law. As a consequence, the valid application of Catholic social doc-
trine requires two mediating steps. In the first, reference must be made
to the originating point in the narrative of each doctrinal proposition.
In the second, equilibration is called for between the formulation of
Dear Theophilus, see the salutation that opens the Gospel According to St. Luke. See
LUKE 1:1.
68 Gospel, Genre, in THE ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY (vol. 2) 1077-78 (1992).
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the question in political or legal theory or the issue of law and policy and
the answer proposed in Catholic social thought.
A. The Inextricably Narrative Character of Each Doctrinal Proposition
The propositions, which receive their encapsulation as elements of
Catholic social doctrine in the style of the Compendium, derive their
meaning and their authority from their niche with the original narra-
tive that the Compendium presupposes. It is, then, essential that the
person seeking to the purely doctrinal content of the Compendium
relate this material, at each point, always back to the original narra-
tive form and context in which the doctrine content was first pro-
posed. The authority of the content of the Compendium arises only
with the compelling nature of the narrative in which it arises. Outside
of its narrative, the danger is that this doctrinal content functions
authoritatively without being any longer – having been broken from
the source and limit of its authority – authoritative.69 Because we
know the narrative and are persuaded by it even after the narrative
is removed, the elements, thus, standing separately within the Com-
pendium, take on a life of their own as being functionally unalterable
and also as functionally inextricably linked among themselves, consid-
ered merely as a set of abstract propositions.70 While the interpretive
69 Consulting the footnotes of Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic
Church discloses that the authority or its propositions wavers widely from conciliar
documents and papal encyclicals on the one side to relatively casual papal addresses
and even curial commentary on the other, with a disproportionate number being of the
latter lesser character. The Compendium’s introduction confirms this with its own
caution or proviso: “it is good to keep in mind that the citations of Magisterial texts are
taken from documents of differing authority including “papal addresses and documents
drafted by offices of the Holy See.” COMPENDIUM, supra note 10, ¶ 8. Further, the Pontif-
ical Council for Justice and Peace, “which has drawn up the present document and is
fully responsible for its content,” acknowledges that it has “prepared the text in a broad-
based consultation with its own Members and Consulters, with different Dicasteries of
the Roman Curia, and with the Bishop’s Conferences of various countries, and with
individual Bishops and with experts on the issues addressed.” Id. ¶ 7. This method
makes it highly doubtful that the Compendium contents possess any authority beyond
the inherent authority of each of the elements it incorporates based on the nature of its
original promulgation.
70 The Compendium appears to claim to be “an instrument” that sets out “in a com-
plete and systematic” manner and in a “concise but complete overview” foundational
principles of Catholic social doctrine. Id. ¶ 8. It seems to ask to be considered in an
“interconnectedness, influencing” its terms “mutually.” Id. ¶ 9. It suggests that it offers
“a systematic approach for finding solutions to problems, so that discernment, judg-
ment and decisions will correspond to reality.” Id. These hints seem to imply that the
Compendiummight function almost like a code. For the reasons developed in this essay,
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reading of doctrine ought indeed to have a life of its own, the
disaggregated elements enumerated in a doctrinal summary very def-
initely should not.
B. The Imperviousness to Application of Doctrinal Encapsulations
While one justifiably seeks to contribute to contemporary political
and moral philosophical perspectives on the task of social reconstruc-
tion and likewise to concrete debates in law and policy from the
perspective of Catholic social thought, one is, nonetheless, making
a mistake by attempting the impossible when one attempts to go
straight from doctrine to one of those tasks. That is because the
doctrine taken apart from the Narrative itself becomes functionally
unrelatable. If one, by bypassing the Narrative, takes a particular
element and attempts to link it to a broader foundation in political
philosophy, or if one seeks to compare it to a functionally parallel but
substantively different element found within a particular legal sys-
tem, one quickly discovers that the element, taken alone, tends to be
impervious to the purpose. It tends to spring back into its doctrinal
mode and remains unrelatable.
A convenient example is the doctrine of subsidiarity set forth by Pope
Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno.71 One can pretend to integrate this
element into a political philosophy placing it alongside some sort of
neo-Aristotelian social philosophy that gives it a plausible philosophical
setting, but the element simply becomes unrelatable when one places it
into any relationship within a philosophical system involving any kind
the authors of the Compendium do not really mean to suggest this. Further reasons
for doubting that the Compendium could work in this way are found in the baffling mix
of sources of its intelligible meaning. These sources are said to include theological,
philosophical, moral, cultural and pastoral considerations. “systematically presented,”
“careful Magisterial reflection” “Church’s constant commitment in fidelity to . . .
Christ,” natural law, and “loving concern for humanity’s destiny.” Id. ¶ 8. The “temple
portal at Delphi” is even cited. Id. ¶ 14. The document is presented as having salience
variably to Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Christians, and “all people of Good will” and
“as food for human and spiritual growth, for individuals and communities alike.” Id. ¶ 1.
Even with all of these qualifications, the drafters are not willing to be entirely pinned
down as “it must not be forgotten that the passing of time and the changing of social
circumstances will require a constant updating of the reflections on the various issues
raised here, in order to interpret the new signs of the times” and it is noted that their
application depends on “[m]oral and pastoral discernment of . . . complex events” Id. ¶ 9.
71 See POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, ¶ 79 (1931) (“It is an injustice and at the
same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher
organization what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.”).
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of tension,72 for example within any of various liberal philosophical
schools of political thought.73 In this regard, it is unrelatable in a way
that an element of the neo-Aristotelianism itself, having the character
of a philosophical idea, would not be. One can pretend to integrate the
element into a comparative legal analysis, by placing it inertly along-
side the same term as it appears in the Treaty for the European
Union,74 to create the impression of apparent harmony, but the term
immediately becomes unrelatable once one pushes the import of certain
radically different presuppositions underlying precisely the same Euro-
pean Union.75 Similarly, the term can be left in a clumsy, unexamined
analogy to the principle of Federalism as it appears in the American
constitutional framework,76 but as soon as one attempts to examine
the implications of the Division of Power assumptions of Federalism,
which are not present in the Catholic concept of subsidiarity,77 the
72 John Finnis’ philosophy presents such an example. However, here one is not to
mistake such an interposition with what Finnis as a philosopher does from the side of
his theoretical development of his idea when he makes a subtle, complex and internal
coherence reference to the Church’s utilization of the notion of “subsidiarity.” JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 46 (1980).
73 One can cite as an example, John Rawls “idea of a social union” with its further
articulation as a “social union of social unions in A THEORY OF JUSTICE 456-64 (1999).
74 The subsidiarity principle was established in the European Union’s Treaty of
Maastricht:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and
of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive compe-
tence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only
if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community.
Treaty on European Union, art. G, art. 3(b), Feb. 7, 1992.
75 Notice that the subsidiary level of organization in this framework is hardly the
grassroots community as in Catholic social thought, but rather the nation state. Thus,
counter to the intuitive expectations of Catholic social thought, the political unit at the
“lower” level has the more extensive share in sovereignty and the one at the higher has
the lesser share in democratic validation of its decisions.
76 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST.
amend. X. For a casual comparison to the subsidiary concept, see Erin Ryan, Federal-
ism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional
Gray Area, 66 MD. LAW REV. 503 (2007).
77 Edward L. Rubin and Malcom Feeley note:
Concern about the concentration of power was one of the guiding forces in the design of our
entire political system. The Founders of our nation, according to the current view, were
motivated by their commitment to liberty and defined themselves as revolutionaries. Feder-
alism can be seen as responding to this basic concern because it insulates certain decisions
from the power of the central government. By doing so, the argument goes, power is diffused
310 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT – 7:2
subsidiarity principle becomes unrelatable and pops back into its doc-
trinal niche within the Compendium.
When one turns to issues in law and public policy, one encounters a
parallel challenge. The policy proposals of the Compendium are set out
as abstractions that assume a hypothetical universe. Concrete policy
debates occur within a particular legal system with its own legislative
and judicial framework within which policy can be adopted. Addition-
ally, they occur within a particular society in which morally significant
interests are experienced in unique configurations and with unique
linkages yielding distinctive patterns of consequences, unintended as
well as intentional.
C. Incorporation of Mediating Steps as Solution
As a consequence of both of these concerns, the valid application of
Catholic social doctrine requires two mediating steps. These steps are:
the reference to the originating point in the narrative of each doctrinal
proposition must be given respect as a constant; and a methodological
framework must be added to sustain equilibration between the formu-
lation of the question in political or legal theory or the issue of law and
policy, on the one hand, and the contemplation of the meaning for these
questions of answers proposed in Catholic social thought, on the other.
1. Narrative as Constant
Like the Christian Gospel itself, that narrative is a seamless web. The
New Testament ends, for example, with the injunction that:
among different governmental entities; in particular, the central government is disabled from
imposing norms upon the states, at least in certain subject areas.
Edward L. Rubin &Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 927-28 (1994). Thus, under the United States Constitution, the
national government with its enumerated powers has precisely no generic coordinating
power centralizing authority with the states receiving the local administration
according to concrete circumstances, as is assumed under the Catholic principle of
subsidiarity. See John Paul II’s exposition of the implications of the subsidiarity princi-
ple in Centesimus Annus:
[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a
lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need
and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view
to the common good.
CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 54, ¶ 48.
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For I testify to every one that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book: If any
man shall add to these things, God shall add unto him the plagues written in this
book. And if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy,
God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from
these things that are written in this book.78
The Narrative is thus a kind of unalterable pdf file. It is constitutive
of Catholic identity, and it also makes its own contribution to the com-
mon human identity advanced by the larger shared narrative of social
reconstruction.
By absorbing all of the narrative and reflecting holistically on it, we
enjoy our relevant moral and religious identities and we derive a gen-
eral normative direction and also a set of attitudes and a bundle of
preferences for what to do, all things considered, if we encounter con-
crete circumstances like the ones described in the Narrative. Thus, the
doctrinal content of the Compendium lends itself primarily into being
knit back together into the Narrative or narratives which directly or
indirectly explain the derivation of the doctrine in the first place. And
there is no objection to that. This Narrative is constitutive of our iden-
tities and shapes us in our attitudes and preferences, and the Compen-
dium can be fairly treated as no more than a roadmap to the Narrative.
The application of propositions of the Compendium may never spring
over this holistic regard for identity and character, but rather must
navigate its way through it.
2. Method of Equilibration
While never allowing oneself to lose track of the originating point of
any particular doctrinal proposition within the perspective of the nar-
rative from which it arises, one will at some point need to move to its
application in the analysis of theoretical problems in law and politics
and to issues in law and policy. At that point, some methodological
framework must be added in support of reaching something like
reflective equilibrium between questions legitimately framed by gen-
uinely philosophical or theological inquiry into the desideratum of
social reconstruction, on the one hand, and the positions which are
apparently suggested on those questions within the narrative of the
encyclicals, on the other.79
78 Book of the Apocalypse 22:18-19 (Douay-Rheims).
79 The method of justification was proposed by Nelson Goodman. NELSON GOODMAN,
FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST (1955). It was adopted by John Rawls in ATheory of Justice:
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In fact, if one wishes to consider the import of Catholic social doctrine
for any existing municipal legal system, one would be required first to
survey the contrasts that are to be drawn between the assumptions of
the given element of Catholic doctrine and those of the legal system on
any number of specific questions. Only then could one begin adequately
to tease out the implications on any particular point of the doctrine for
the legal system. As a first step in generating the necessary framework,
one would need to turn to political philosophy for a heuristic statement
of fundamental or generic questions that provide access from an inde-
pendent vantage point to the internal terms of the legal system. Such
questions presumably relate to such issues as the following: (a) role of
state; (b) nature of society; (c) relation of society and state; (d) source of
legitimacy of law; (e) content of rights, understood juridically; (f) nature
of the family; (g) criteria of market freedom; (h) penal justice; and
(i) ground of the binding force of international law.80
Before one could proceed to the task of discovering the implications of
doctrine for law, however, they would need to take a second necessary
step. Namely, one would need, at that point, to open the “pdf file” of the
Narrative to extract directions suggested by the Narrative content to
answering the specific questions, that philosophical inquiry can frame
as arising under law either generally in concept or at a particular point
in time as a matter of policy. Concepts derived philosophically or
theologically from outside the narrative itself become tools by which
the seamless web on the level of the story that gives us our identity is
“cut” for the sake of a meaningful theoretical contribution or responsi-
ble public policy position.
In addition, a further hermeneutic is required, even assuming that
one has accounted for the meaningful formulation of questions within
the setting a given legal system, to bridge the gap between the facts of
The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered
judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular instances or cases, the principles or
rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on
accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements
wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method
succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an acceptable coherence
among these beliefs.
Reflective Equilibrium, in STANFORD ENYCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium.
80 By contrast, the Compendium builds in a sequence that starts with the economy of
salvation and then moves through the following sequence of steps of exposition: the
Church as teacher, the human person, rights, principles of social doctrine, family, work,
economy, politics and law, and international cooperation and law. See COMPENDIUM,
supra note 10, at vii-xv.
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the case that in the Narrative has been adjudicated by the Roman
Pontiff in the relevant encyclical and the theoretical construct or the
facts of the case that is the object of public policy debate, as the case
may be. Some further hermeneutic of analogy is needed to justify one’s
conclusions.81 As the period of time grows separating our present from
the increasingly distant past promulgation of the particular Encyclical
we are considering, the hermeneutical challenge becomes correspond-
ingly more complex.
VI. Conclusion
Rather than entering into the construction of philosophical positions
or public policy proposals beginning from the vantage of doctrine, we
should approach them from the Narrative, which explains and gives
authority to the doctrine. We should approach that Narrative, in turn,
in a twofold manner, at once entering into the seamlessness of its story
which forms our identity and shapes our attitudes and preferences,
and, at the same time, stopping to formulate a responsible hermeneutic
for applying its doctrinal content, in philosophically coherent, theologi-
cally cogent, and legally apt ways, to current issues and problems aris-
ing in the real world in all of its immediacy.
81 As the text’s origin retreats into the past, the reader approaches the text in an
awareness of the difference in horizon of the author and the reader and seeks to reach a
fusion of perspectives in an agreement of understanding. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 302-07 (1989). The Compendium recognizes as much: “However, it
must not be forgotten that the passing of time and the changing of social circumstances
will require a constant updating of the reflections on the various issues raised here, in
order to interpret the new signs of the times.” COMPENDIUM, supra note 10, ¶ 9.
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